Regarding the concept of so-called Irresistible Grace:
"this act of drawing is an act of power, yet not of force; God in drawing of unwilling, makes willing in the day of his power: he enlightens the understanding, bends the will, gives an heart of flesh, sweetly allures by the power of his grace, and engages the soul to come to Christ, and give up itself to him; he draws with the bands of love. Drawing, though it supposes power and influence, yet not always coaction and force: music draws the ear, love the heart, and pleasure the mind. [emphases my own]"
-Gill's Exposition of the Bible, John 6:44
Monday, April 14, 2008
[Xanga] the validity of postmodern influences on the interpretation of the Bible?
Postmodernism is a movement that is at once, depending on the individual with whom you're discussing it, ill-defined, vitally crucial to intellectual endeavours, a complete crock of nonsense, or the most revolutionary (and true, whatever that means) paradigm to come along in the history of human knowledge (again, whatever that means). Regardless of one's stance on the postmodern worldview, however, one is hard-pressed to not at least admit that it has strongly influenced post-Enlightenment readings and conceptions of truth.
My question is whether the postmodern hypothesis, construed by me to in general be such: "the meaning of any text is solely a matter of cultural and social interpretation," (and I readily admit that this may be a straw man, and that postmodernism in its true form would hold to something other than this tenet; though I would defend this statement as one which is strongly characteristic of a postmodern worldview) has any bearing (or what bearing it has, if any) on the interpretation of the Bible by a Christian; the latter designation I take to mean "one who believes in the existence of God as a trinitarian entity, and moreover in the doctrines of divine creation, incarnation, atonement, intercession of the Holy Spirit, and special as well as general (including Biblical) revelation." (generally, one who accepts in full the Nicene Creed, though I find it plausible, if improbable, that one would reject in part the Nicene Creed but still fall under the ability to receive the intercession of the Paraclete [Holy Spirit, or Holy Ghost] in the revelation of Scripture)
As a caveat preceding the following, I note that my line of thought follows the presumptions that I stated above under the designation of a Christian. The validity of these assumptions (both in their use to define Christian as well as their truth value) may be called into question, but for now I beg the use of these.
The basic question at hand is to what degree I may lend credence to the version of the Bible that I own, that now sits on my desktop. I see two general categories into which a Christian, in good faith, may place his or her belief regarding the veracity of that Bible: first, that it is in whole and in part the work of God, from the first writing divinely inspired and subsequently divinely translated, with every word yet extant and meaning what it did when it first "proceeded from the mouth of God". Second, that it is a human translation of a divine text, whose original language was and yet is divinely ordained, but the translations of which contain human error and bias; the latter which may yet be of value, but require great thought in order to "rightly divide the word of truth" and thereby arrive at the original meaning of the text from a corruption, as applying a Photoshop filter to sharpen a blurry or corrupted image file (On a side note, I take this second stance to be that of many Muslims, who find it necessary to study Arabic in order that their examinations of the Qu'ran be examinations of the direct words of Allah, not born of any intermediary). (Note that I ask here not whether or not the Bible is the extent of God's revelation to man, but where the extent of the Bible's authority falls: divine revelation or human translation. This question limits its scope to the Bible; another, equally [if not more] crucial issue, is whether or not the scope of divine literary revelation is likewise limited, an issue of great importance to Muslims, Mormons, and certain other religions. Regardless of the Bible's current translation as either a human or divine work, one may hold that it is or is not the whole extent of literary revelation, though I tend to believe that the most reasonable reading of the Bible in my native tongue is a claim to exclusivity among literature.)
These overly bold statement - that one's belief may only fall into one of these two categories - immediately begs the question, as to whether or not one may hold another. Is there a middle ground, or a third point of view?
(work in progress)
My question is whether the postmodern hypothesis, construed by me to in general be such: "the meaning of any text is solely a matter of cultural and social interpretation," (and I readily admit that this may be a straw man, and that postmodernism in its true form would hold to something other than this tenet; though I would defend this statement as one which is strongly characteristic of a postmodern worldview) has any bearing (or what bearing it has, if any) on the interpretation of the Bible by a Christian; the latter designation I take to mean "one who believes in the existence of God as a trinitarian entity, and moreover in the doctrines of divine creation, incarnation, atonement, intercession of the Holy Spirit, and special as well as general (including Biblical) revelation." (generally, one who accepts in full the Nicene Creed, though I find it plausible, if improbable, that one would reject in part the Nicene Creed but still fall under the ability to receive the intercession of the Paraclete [Holy Spirit, or Holy Ghost] in the revelation of Scripture)
As a caveat preceding the following, I note that my line of thought follows the presumptions that I stated above under the designation of a Christian. The validity of these assumptions (both in their use to define Christian as well as their truth value) may be called into question, but for now I beg the use of these.
The basic question at hand is to what degree I may lend credence to the version of the Bible that I own, that now sits on my desktop. I see two general categories into which a Christian, in good faith, may place his or her belief regarding the veracity of that Bible: first, that it is in whole and in part the work of God, from the first writing divinely inspired and subsequently divinely translated, with every word yet extant and meaning what it did when it first "proceeded from the mouth of God". Second, that it is a human translation of a divine text, whose original language was and yet is divinely ordained, but the translations of which contain human error and bias; the latter which may yet be of value, but require great thought in order to "rightly divide the word of truth" and thereby arrive at the original meaning of the text from a corruption, as applying a Photoshop filter to sharpen a blurry or corrupted image file (On a side note, I take this second stance to be that of many Muslims, who find it necessary to study Arabic in order that their examinations of the Qu'ran be examinations of the direct words of Allah, not born of any intermediary). (Note that I ask here not whether or not the Bible is the extent of God's revelation to man, but where the extent of the Bible's authority falls: divine revelation or human translation. This question limits its scope to the Bible; another, equally [if not more] crucial issue, is whether or not the scope of divine literary revelation is likewise limited, an issue of great importance to Muslims, Mormons, and certain other religions. Regardless of the Bible's current translation as either a human or divine work, one may hold that it is or is not the whole extent of literary revelation, though I tend to believe that the most reasonable reading of the Bible in my native tongue is a claim to exclusivity among literature.)
These overly bold statement - that one's belief may only fall into one of these two categories - immediately begs the question, as to whether or not one may hold another. Is there a middle ground, or a third point of view?
(work in progress)
[Xanga] little note on Kant
In Kant's 1785 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, he includes a passage often translated as advocating a begrudging adherence to duty as more praiseworthy than a delighted or joyful act of duty. The logic goes that one's duty ought to be performed out of love of that duty as an end in itself, and if any superceding or, yes, even adjunct reason for performing duty exists, that the praiseworthy nature of the carrying out of that duty has been in some way lessened. Opposed to this is an act of begrudging duty, wherein one does not enjoy an act that must be undertaken, but instead chooses to carry out the act because of mere love of duty.
The question is, of course, is one then to constantly begrudge his duties? It seems inconsistent with what we think of as duty and morality to say that the most moral person is he who acts in a way so as always to be moral, but so as never to love that which is done. In fact, it is even consistent with many systems of morality to say that acting in a way so as to begrudge one's moral duty is in itself immoral; the flip side of which is to say that acting in such a way as to grow to love one's moral duty is in itself a moral duty.
However, in Kant's 1793 Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, he includes a passage pertaining to sin and evil which seems to me clarifying his stance on duty and morality.
He writes that "although [any] maxim is good with respect to its object... and perhaps even powerful enough in practice, it is not purely moral, i.e. it has not, as it should be, adopted the law alone as its sufficient incentive... in other words, actions conforming to duty are not done purely from duty." Moreover, "there is no difference... between a human being of good morals and a morally good human being, except that the actions of the former do not always have, perhaps never have, the law as their sole and supreme incentive, whereas those of the latter always do."
Perhaps Kant is drawing a distinction between merely duty-bound actions and moral actions? I forget the exact context and phrasing of the passage from the Groundwork, but perhaps he is placing moral actions on a level above and beyond duty-bound actions, as a teleological understsanding of morality replaces a deontological framework (at least, possibly does). While one does not understand "the law as their sole and supreme incentive," as in the case of the "human being of good morals," following duty begrudgingly is preferable to following duty that is sought-after. When one, however, comes to an understanding of "the law itself," by whatever means, that law is then internalized and one may begin to live as a "morally good human being."
The question is, of course, is one then to constantly begrudge his duties? It seems inconsistent with what we think of as duty and morality to say that the most moral person is he who acts in a way so as always to be moral, but so as never to love that which is done. In fact, it is even consistent with many systems of morality to say that acting in a way so as to begrudge one's moral duty is in itself immoral; the flip side of which is to say that acting in such a way as to grow to love one's moral duty is in itself a moral duty.
However, in Kant's 1793 Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, he includes a passage pertaining to sin and evil which seems to me clarifying his stance on duty and morality.
He writes that "although [any] maxim is good with respect to its object... and perhaps even powerful enough in practice, it is not purely moral, i.e. it has not, as it should be, adopted the law alone as its sufficient incentive... in other words, actions conforming to duty are not done purely from duty." Moreover, "there is no difference... between a human being of good morals and a morally good human being, except that the actions of the former do not always have, perhaps never have, the law as their sole and supreme incentive, whereas those of the latter always do."
Perhaps Kant is drawing a distinction between merely duty-bound actions and moral actions? I forget the exact context and phrasing of the passage from the Groundwork, but perhaps he is placing moral actions on a level above and beyond duty-bound actions, as a teleological understsanding of morality replaces a deontological framework (at least, possibly does). While one does not understand "the law as their sole and supreme incentive," as in the case of the "human being of good morals," following duty begrudgingly is preferable to following duty that is sought-after. When one, however, comes to an understanding of "the law itself," by whatever means, that law is then internalized and one may begin to live as a "morally good human being."
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